It is the duty of the directors of a company to run the business of the company in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. In principle, the company, alone, is responsible for the debts incurred in the running of the company and the creditors are, in principle, precluded from looking to the directors or shareholders for payment of any shortfall arising as a result of the company's insolvency. This principle has, in a number of jurisdictions undergone statutory change such that in certain circumstances, the directors and others who were concerned with the management of the company may be made liable to contribute, personally, to meet the payment -in part or entirelyof the company's debts. This paper aims to explore this statutory jurisdiction. It also seeks to describe succinctly the process by which the shift from unlimited to limited liability trading was achieved. It will end by examining briefly a comparatively new phenomenon, namely that of a shift in the focus of the directors' duties from company and shareholders to the creditors as the company becomes insolvent and nears the stage of a formal declaration of its insolvent status -the so-called 'zone of insolvency'.
Introduction
It is a generally accepted proposition that the duty of the directors of a company is to run the business of the company in the best interests of the company.
Some, who are perhaps less pedantic about the separation in legal terms of the company from its shareholders, would extend the beneficiary of these duties to include the shareholders. Nevertheless, this separation is of crucial importance, in particular in shifting the primary liability for the debts incurred in running the business, from the individual entrepreneur, to the company which, in law, owns and carries on the business. The company is the primary debtor and the legal status of the entrepreneur is that of being a director of, and a shareholder with limited liability in, the company. Thus, in principle, the company, alone, is responsible for the debts incurred in the running of the company and the creditors are, in principle, precluded from looking to the entrepreneur for payment of any shortfall arising as a result of the company's insolvency.
It is also the case that in a number of jurisdictions statutory changes have sought, in certain circumstances, to render the directors and others who were concerned with the management of the company prior to the insolvent liquidation, liable to contribute to the assets of the company so as to assist the insolvent estate in meeting the company's debts to its creditors. This paper aims to explore this statutory jurisdiction. Before this, however, it will seek to describe briefly the process by which the shift from unlimited to limited liability trading was achieved. Thereafter, it will look at the common law response to this changed dispensation. It will end by examining briefly a comparatively new phenomenon, namely that of a shift in the focus of the directors' duties from company and shareholders to creditors as the company becomes insolvent and nears the stage of a formal declaration of its insolvent status. As we will discover, this new phenomenon seems to have struck a chord in many different jurisdictions, but is, on the other hand elusive and not without controversy. If, as this principle would have it, the focus of the duty of director and officers shifts to creditors when the company enters the zone of insolvency, the creditors should be able to enforce that duty before the formal declaration of insolvency.
Arguably, they should also be entitled to seek information about the proposed actions of the company and they should be able to apply to court to prohibit any action which they perceive to be against their interests.
The notion of the 'zone of insolvency' may have a distinctly modern ring about it, but I hope to show that it has a long pedigree. I hope also to illustrate that it encompasses a clash between two fundamental principles in the conception and operation of limited liability companies, namely the protection of the company's creditors and the right and the duty of the directors and officers of the company to run the business of the company in the best interests of the shareholders.
Thus the first part of this paper looks forward to formal insolvency, the second looks back from formal insolvency to the actions of the directors as the company approaches its downfall. Each part is distinctive. Yet, there is an obvious link between these two parts. If the legal system does provide for the personal liability of the directors and officers who led the company into formal insolvency, this is likely to influence the conduct of those directors and officers when they perceive this to be the likely fate of the company. The threat of such personal liability may encourage decisions and conduct which further the creditors' interests and thus, informally, bring about this shift in the focus of the duty of directors and officers.
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I take the case of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd
The period leading up to Salomon as the starting point for the exploration of these ideas. In its result, this decision greatly strengthened the position of directors and shareholders (whom I will sometimes refer to, collectively, as the entrepreneur or the entrepreneurial interest) at the expense of the creditors. Much of the post-Salomon history has been the digesting of the dispensation which was created by the decision, and the seeking to restore, or at least maintain, the balance between these competing interests.
Salomon's case was one of the great exports of the British Empire and justifiably can claim the title of father or grandfather, or maybe Godfather, of company law for colonials and colonists alike. In South Africa, where I first studied company law under the great Professor HR ('Bobby') Hahlo -later the Director of the Institute of Comparative Law at McGill University, MontrealSalomon's case had pride of place at the start of the course and was on the first substantive page of Hahlo's "Company Law Through the Cases", the first company law casebook of the English-inspired common law world.
To law students, Salomon's case meant the authority for the proposition that the company was a separate legal entity from that of the people who constituted the company, as well as the beginning of the process of wrestling with the veil of incorporation and its piercing or -in more genteel discussionsits lifting. The first of these propositions is at the root of the shift in the balance of power from creditor to entrepreneur, the second is our continuing attempt to ensure that we have achieved the right balance between these two opposing commercial forces.
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the overwhelming mass of commercial trading in Great Britain was undertaken by single traders or by There was no separation of human nature and economics for McCulloch.
In the scheme laid down by Providence for the government of the world, there is no shifting or narrowing of responsibilities, every man being personally answerable to the utmost extent for all his actions. But the advocates of limited liability proclaim in their superior wisdom that the scheme of Providence may be advantageously modified, and that debts and contracts may be contracted which the debtors though they have the means, shall not be bound to discharge. One of McCullough's best known pupils was Lord Overstone, a top flight political economist of the day who described the Limited Liability Act as a fraud on creditors, a harbinger ofreckless speculation. … A great disease … was likely to settle upon this country -the indiscriminate desire for limited liability.
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Parliament had to act, in his view, to stem the rising tide of over-trading and speculation by makingthe laws of bankruptcy more stringent, and the responsibility of all traders more severe.
12
Yet, despite its obvious appeal, limited liability was slow in actually coming. For one reason or another, the established pattern of high par value shares remained the order of the day, 13 a sum which represented the sanguine expectations of a fond owner rather than anything that can be called a businesslike or reasonable estimate of value.
and there was also a strong body of opinion which held that the protection of limited liability was intended only for investors in large enterprises and was not for single traders or small partnerships. There can be no doubt that in this case an attempt has been made to use the machinery of the Companies Act, for a purpose for which it was never intended. The legislature contemplated the encouragement of trade by enabling a comparatively small number of persons-namely not less than seven
The appeal raises a question of very great importance, not only to the persons immediately affected by the decision, but also to a large number of persons who form what are called 'one-man companies.' Such companies were unheard of until a comparatively recent period, but have become very common of late years.
...
16
Another of the judges in the Court of Appeal was less measured in his language:
-to carry on business with a limited joint stock or capital, and without the risk of liability beyond the loss of such joint stock or capital. But the legislature never contemplated an extension of limited liability to sole traders or to a fewer number than seven. ... Although in the present case, there were, and are, seven members, yet it was manifest that six of them are members simply in order to enable the seventh himself to carry on business with limited liability.
... The company in this case has been regarded by [the judge in the court below] as the agent of Aron Salomon. I should rather liken the company to a trustee for him -a trustee improperly brought into existence by him to enable him to do what the statute prohibits.
17
But legalise this 'scandal', the House of Lords did. In effect, the basis for the various concurring speeches in the House of Lords was that Salomon had done no more and no less than was required of him to create a limited liability It would be lamentable if a scheme like this could not be defeated. If we were to permit it to succeed we would be authorizing a perversion of the Joint Stock Companies Act. We should be giving vitality to that which is a myth and a fiction. ... To legalize such a transaction would be a scandal.
/211 38 company. The rest followed. With the company created, a separate legal person came into existence and conducted its own business, entered into its own contracts (including a contract to purchase the business from Salomon) and there was nothing in the statute to suggest that this was wrongful. Lord Herschell, expressed this view in the following terms:
18
This was a most significant moment in the history of British corporate and commercial law and it shaped much that was to come, in particular that the financial burden of corporate failure would be thrown on to the creditors.
Investors and more importantly directors, executives and management would be relieved of the threat of losing their own wealth as a consequence of business failure. The decision of the House of Lords -sanctioned as it must be taken to have been by the legislature in not altering the Companies Act in the wake of this decision -could be seen as an open invitation to the entrepreneur, small, as well as big, to go out and trade for all that his or her creditors were worth. The issue was not so much limited liability for the passive investor -few if any begrudged the latter's protection, indeed this was necessary to secure continued investment.
It may be that a company constituted like that under consideration was not in the contemplation of the legislature at the time when the Act authorizing limited liability was passed; that if what is possible under the enactments as they stand had been foreseen a minimum sum would have been fixed as the least denomination of share permissible; and that it would have been made a condition that each of the seven persons should have a substantial interest in the company. But we have to interpret the law, not to make it; and it must be remembered that no one need trust a limited liability company unless he so please, and that before he does so, he can ascertain, if he so please, what is the capital of the company and how it is held. But limited liability for those who managed and directed the company, that is, those in a position to make mistakes, to conduct their businesses without proper care and attention, and worse, to abuse the faith invested in them and to be guilty of fraud, was something else.
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Under the ancien regime, a trader was liable to the full extent of his fortune for debts incurred in the carrying on of his business. Creditors had to be paid in full, as far as this was possible with no artificial limits protecting part or all of the debtor's assets. The new regime not only removed that unlimited liability; it also created the machinery for the replacement of the human trader by the company trader. The latter remained fully liable without limit, just as its predecessor had been. Furthermore as a separate person, it, alone entered into the trading contracts and incurred the debts, it alone owned the property with which and on which the business was conducted, and where litigation was necessary, it, the company, was recognised as the appropriate litigant. Arguably, the limited liability conferred on the investors in the company was unnecessary and served only to make the investor feel more secure. But the House of Lords famously thought otherwise. There /211 40 was no room for inferring such an intention and thus, they helped propel Britain into a new age.
3
Directors duties and the zone of insolvency -the early period
Salomon's case made more urgent the need for some vigilance on the part of creditors as to the solvency of their debtors who were registered companies.
They had, after all, been told so by the House of Lords that "[e]very creditor is entitled to get and to hold the best security the law allows him to take". 22 And, as we shall see shortly, those who could -essentially lenders as opposed to trade creditors
23
The unsecured creditors of A Salomon and Company Limited, may be entitled to sympathy, but they have only themselves to blame for their misfortunes. They trusted the company, I suppose, because they had long dealt with Mr Salomon, and he had always paid his way; but they had full notice that they were no longer dealing with an individual and they must be taken to have been cognisant of the memorandum and of the articles of association -did. But as for those who could not, well, it was a brave new world and at least they knew the scoRe
24
Having notice was all very well, but the only real protection for most traders was to abstain from dealing with a limited liability company, hardly an option for most. Investigating and monitoring the solvency of the company was equally illusory. But some lenders, on the other hand, could and did take full advantage of two significant instruments of credit and security -the floating charge and receivership. The latter was of ancient vintage as a means of managing leased real property, but emerged in the late nineteenth century as a vital adjunct to the floating charge, which itself dated from about 1870. Salomon, himself, had loaned money to the company and had secured his loan by means of a floating charge. The only one of the nine judgments in all courts to make this clear is that of Lord Justice Kay. 26 Others speak only of the debenture issued to Salomon so it can be safely assumed that at that stage, anyway, a debenture was taken to include a floating charge.
27
For such a catastrophe as has occurred in this case some would blame the law that allows the creation of a floating charge. But a floating charge is too convenient a form of security to be lightly abolished. I have long thought, and I believe some of your Lordships also think, that the ordinary trade creditors of a trading company ought to have a preferential claim on the assets in liquidation in respect of debts incurred within a certain limited time before the winding-up. But that is not the law at present. Everybody knows that when there is a winding-up debenture-holders generally step in and sweep off everything; and a great scandal it is.
Indeed, it was this aspect of the Salomon case which, commercially speaking, was the most crucial. Not only was Salomon not obliged to indemnify the company's creditors, but the floating charge enabled him to be first in the queue of creditors. This must have added insult to the injury evinced by the four judges below and there is a somewhat lame recognition of this in the House of Lords:
28
Receivership had been a means by which a landlord recovered possession of the leased property, and was now evolving, alongside the floating charge to meet the needs of commercial lenders, to enable the latter to manage the business over whose assets the charge conferred security for the loan. Given that the appointment of a receiver was then in the discretion of the court, 30 the issue remained open as to under what circumstances during the life of the debtor, the court would accede to an application such an appointment.
On the one hand, the creditor would undoubtedly be looking for protection of the assets which secured the loan; on the other hand the debtor was not in liquidation. In Re New York Taxicab Company Limited, 31 it was made clear that mere insolvency on the part of the debtor was not sufficient to sustain such an application. Although the debtor's assets were insufficient to secure the loan in full, and, if realised, would be insufficient to repay the principal and interest arrears owing to the debenture-holders, this did not justify the appointment of a receiver. The assets were not in jeopardy in the sense that there were no proceedings for their seizure; nor were any winding-up proceedings threatened.
32
The balance between, on the one hand, an insolvent debtor wishing to continue to run its business and, on the other, secured creditors fearful that this would further deplete the security, proved even in these early post-Salomon days to be elusive. A few months after the New York Taxicab application, the matter On this occasion, again there was no threat of seizure of the debtor's assets, nor of the initiation of liquidation proceedings. The debenture was not enforceable and the debtor had a reserve fund made up of accumulated profits of some £10,000. The company was proposing to distribute the fund among the shareholders as share dividends. Yet here the court distinguished the New York Taxicab case and granted the debenture-holder's application for the appointment of a /211 43 receiver. The crucial difference was that there, although the company was insolventthere was nothing to show that, if the company continued to carry on its business as it was then doing, it might not before long again be prosperous and in a position to pay all its debenture-holders as well as its other creditors. It was not a case where the business of the company had come to an end… 34 Credible evidence as to the cessation of the business (and the settled decision to assume no other business -which it might be said is implied in the Tilt Cove case) is critical. In a case where all that is wanting for an insolvent liquidation is the formal order -which we are led to believe was the case in Tilt Cove -it would seem eminently arguable that the debtor has entered the zone of insolvency and that the beneficiaries of the directors' duty have been switched from shareholders to creditors. Yet a question remains -which creditors?
Secured creditors and unsecured creditors may well have different interests, especially if the unsecured creditors have a plan for the resuscitation of the debtor's business. The issue might then be the credibility of such a plan as against the superior status of the secured creditors. We will explore the essentially modern phenomenon of the shift of duty in the zone of insolvency, shortly, but before doing so we need to refer to a further complication in the post-Salomon period, the decision in Lawrence v West Somerset Mineral Railway Company.
In the Tilt Cove case, on the other hand, the company's business was clearly finished. It had long mined a copper mine -which, incidentally was situated on the coast of Newfoundland -and there was powerful evidence that all the copper had been exhausted. Once the reserve fund went there would be hardly assets left in the company and clearly though there were no arrears in interest payments, there would be insufficient to repay the principal loan. This justified a finding that the assets being in jeopardy and, therefore, the appointment of a receiver. Lawrence's case
The facts of Lawrence's case differ little from that of Tilt Cove. The defendant company's only asset -£5,500.00 annually from the lease of a railway which it owned -was about to expire. The lease was about to run out, the railway no longer carried traffic and the line had been scrapped. On receipt of the (final) annual rent, the company proposed to distribute this in accordance with the usual pattern -in interest payments to the debenture stockholders and dividends to the preference and ordinary shareholders. The proceedings were brought by the debenture-holders for an injunction to prohibit the distribution on the grounds that the following year there would be no or no sufficient assets to repay the principal loan. There were no arrears in interest payments, nor any other breaches of covenant, and, therefore nothing on which to base a case for the enforcement of the charge.
The evidence of the end of the company's business seemed as cogent as the corresponding evidence in Tilt Cove (The railway was said to be "practically derelict and [could] never be reopened and worked at a profit"). The only difference was in the nature of the claim. Whereas in Tilt Cove the proceedings had been for the appointment of a receiver on the grounds that the debtor's assets were in jeopardy, here the proceedings were based on the claim that the money received should be treated as capital, rather than profits and therefore could not be used for a dividend distribution (which according to longstanding principles could only be paid out of profits and never out of capital). One of the submissions on behalf of the debenture-holders was formulated in 'zone of insolvency terms', …the directors of the company are quasi-trustees, and it is their duty as business men to set aside part of the funds coming to them for depreciation and loss of capital.
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The court rejected the claim. The "only matter" according to the judge was "the true character of the fund in dispute" and the £5,500.00 was profit and according to the principle then prevailing, there was no obligation to make good any previous years' losses before declaring dividends. The clear thrust of this decision was underlined by the further ruling that the debenture-holders, in fact, had no locus standi to bring the claim.
That there may be circumstances in which the Court would interfere at the suit of a debenture stock holder in the plaintiff's position to restrain the company from doing acts to his injury I do not doubt, but where the sole relief claimed is a declaration that a particular application of moneys in which the stockholder has no direct or immediate interest, and upon which he has no specific charge, will be ultra vires the company, I do not think I ought to hold the plaintiff competent to maintain the action.
37
Lawrence's case emphasised the principle of entrepreneurial control. It followed the spirit of Salomon and resisted the route opened up by the receivership appointment cases where the debtor's assets were held to be in jeopardy. Yet, as far as UK entrepreneurialism was concerned, it was something of a pyrrhic victory for the entrepreneur. Loan creditors abandoned the court-based route of receivership appointments to seize control of the debtor's business and concentrated instead on expanding the contractual route offered by the floating charge. It was not long before provisions in the charge were upheld, allowing the creditor to appoint a receiver out of court, not only to protect the assets, but also to manage the business to the exclusion of the debtor's directors, and almost entirely in the interests of the secured creditor.
38
In many ways, the comprehensive control over the debtor which the receiver, appointed by the debenture-holder, came to exercise rendered unnecessary any thought in UK commercial practice, of the concept of the zone of insolvency and the shift of focus from shareholders to creditors. Once a debtor, which had 37 At 257. 38 Preferential creditors had to be paid before any reduction could be made in the secured creditor's debt, as was discovered to the embarrassment of at least two out of court appointed receivers, /211 46 granted a floating charge to a lender to secure an overdraft for the running of the business, went above the permitted overdraft limit, the lending bank could consider using its trump card of appointing an out of court receiver, regardless of whether a theoretical notion of an objectively assessed 'zone of insolvency' had been entered. In fact, the reign of the receiver in the UK came to an end on in which the court stripped the corporate protection from two fraudsters who had attempted shield from the public being invited to subscribe for shares in a company being promoted, the fact that that were both undischarged bankrupts.
The common law response to Salomon
The doctrine of lifting the veil of incorporation has spawned a huge jurisprudence Aside from commercial abuse, other issues have demanded that courts and legislatures eliminate the use of the corporate form for the avoidance of legitimate obligations. In the matter of debt avoidance, while the courts were well able to cope with fraudulent conduct on the part of debtors, anything less than fraud posed a serious systemic problem. The grant of limited liability to entrepreneurs was designed to encourage the taking of risks, so to punish commercial conduct that did not amount to fraud by stripping away the protection of limited liability, might run counter to the commercial order which had been established. It has to be said, however, that this provision has proved to be unsatisfactory, almost from its very inception. It was held to apply only with the soundest of proof of fraud and it left unanswered the issue of whether such provision should be /211 49 available where the directors' conduct was less than fraud but also not innocent. This, in itself, was a reason to seek an alternative basis on which to hold directors liable, where their management caused or contributed to the failure of their companies.
In 1962, the Jenkins Committee drew attention to thewidespread criticism that the Companies Act as a whole does not at present deal adequately with the situation arising from fraud and incompetence on the part of directors -particularly directors of insolvent companies. The opportunity to implement these or any analogous proposals has never been taken, with the result that there is now universal dissatisfaction and frustration with this branch of the law. This is to be particularly deplored because it breeds both disrespect and contempt for the law in a context where there is need to enlist public support in an endeavour to promote the highest standards of business probity and competence. /211 50 such cases, the few remaining assets of the failed company could be sold off at 'knockdown' prices to the newly created companies leaving creditors unpaid and corrupt directors not merely unpunished for their incompetence, but even benefiting thereby. 'that it should be an offence to carry on a business dishonestly; and right, that, in the absence of dishonesty, no offence should be committed. Where, however, what is in question is not the punishment of an offender, but the provision of a civil remedy for those who have suffered financial loss, a requirement that dishonesty be proved is inappropriate. Compensation ought ... to be available to those who suffer foreseeable loss as a result, not only of fraudulent, but also of unreasonable behaviour'.
The purpose of this recommendation was to substitute an objective test to determine the directors' personal liability for the subjective one which existed.
The essence of the Committee's proposals was summed up by its recommendation that -/211 51 if the directors at any time consider the company to be insolvent, they should have a duty to take immediate steps for the company to be placed in receivership, administration or liquidation. Failure to do so would normally expose any director who is party to the company's continued trading to civil liability. (1) Subject to subsection (3) below, if in the course of the winding-up of a company it appears that subsection (2) of this section applies in relation to a person who is or has been a director of the company, the court, on the application of the liquidator, may declare that that person is to be liable to make such contribution (if any) to the company's assets as the court thinks proper.
(2) This subsection applies in relation to a person if -(a) the company has gone into insolvent liquidation, (b) at some time before the commencement of the windingup of the company, that person knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation, and (c) that person was a director of the company at that time;
The court shall not make a declaration under this section with respect to any person if it is satisfied that after the condition specified in subsection (2)(b) was first satisfied in relation to him that person took every step with a view to minimizing the potential loss to the company's creditors as (assuming him to have known that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation) he ought to have taken.
(4) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (3) the facts which a director of a company ought to know or ascertain, the conclusions which he ought to reach and the steps which he ought to take are those which would be known or ascertained or reached or taken, by a reasonably diligent person having both -/211(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions that are carried out by that director in relation to the company, and (b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that that director has.
(5) The reference in subsection (4) to the functions carried out in relation to a company by a director of the company includes any functions which he does not carry out but which have been entrusted to him (6) For the purposes of this section, a company goes into insolvent liquidation if it goes into liquidation at a time when its assets are insufficient for the payment of its debts, and other liabilities and the expenses of winding-up. that is to say a lower threshold than expecting or knowing that the company is insolvent. The standard for suspecting the insolvency is that of the awareness of insolvency by a reasonable person in a like position in a company in the company's circumstances. Like the British provision, the Australian provision applies only to directors, but the definition is wide enough to include shadow or de facto directors.
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The South African provision has a similar object to the British and Australian provisions, but has some novel features. It provides as follows:
If it at any time appears that any business of a corporation was or is being carried on recklessly, with gross negligence or with intent to defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose, a court may on the application of the Master, or any creditor, member or liquidator of the corporation, declare that any person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in any such manner, shall be personally liable for all or any of such debts or other liabilities of the corporation as the court may direct, and the court may give such further orders as it considers proper for the purpose of giving effect to the declaration and enforcing that liability.
It is not limited in its application to directors, nor to the circumstances of the company being insolvent, although the latter is probably of little significance because if the company is solvent, the creditor's debt will be paid in the normal way. But the fact that it is not so limited is underlined by the fact that its use is not limited to a liquidator, but is also available, inter alios, to creditors and members of the company. The possibility has been explored of the use of this provision -in fact of the equivalent section to the same effect in the South African Close Corporations Act, 58 -as a fast track debt-enforcement process, where the company is not insolvent. This was successful in one instance, 59 but this was clearly contradicted by a later case of the South African Court of Appeal. 60 The later court held that the provision should not be available where the company was able to meet the debt. Thus even if the person who acted on behalf of the company had been reckless or even fraudulent, this should be of no concern to the creditor, whose only interest is the recovery of the debt. This would, with respect, seem to be the preferable approach to a provision whose purpose, arguably, is the protection of creditors rather than the punishment of errant management. 61 Apart from this it would seem unnecessary to import into the debtor/creditor relationship alien concepts such as to the state of the debtor's mind, unless the circumstances were commercially compelling. It is interesting to reflect on the distinction between this holding and that which rejected the use of section 424 when the company debtor was not insolvent. In both instances, the company was not in liquidation and was continuing to trade.
Yet, in the latter instance, the company was no longer under any obligation to pay the debt in view of the agreed scheme of arrangement under section 311 of the South African Companies Act. The interpretation of the court, that the erstwhile creditor remained a creditor for the purposes of section 424, is in line with the protection of creditors being the primary purpose of the section.
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The experience of these countries where there is specific legislation aimed at providing creditors with a claim against errant directors and other officers where the debt is irrecoverable from the company, is mixed. /211 55 not to disturb the delicate balance between encouraging entrepreneurial initiative and protecting creditors against far-fetched, outlandish and fraudulent conduct on the part of the entrepreneur. The more carefully manicured the terms of the legislation to take account of this imperative, the more it is subject to interpretation. Given the court's concern to avoid hindsight and to second guess business decisions, there is little room for manoeuvre. Added to this, there are issues such as the cost of the proceedings -especially in the circumstances of an insolvent estate -and the possibility that even in successful applications, the errant directors and officers may not have the money to meet the judgment.
6
Shifting directors duties from shareholders to creditors in the zone
of insolvency
The idea that prior to any formal filing for insolvency, the directors of a company may be obliged to consider the interests of the company's creditors to the exclusion of the company or its shareholders, can be traced back at least 20 In a solvent company the proprietary interests of the shareholders entitle them as a general body to be regarded as the company when questions of the duty of directors arise. If, as a general body, they authorise or ratify a particular action of the directors, there can be no challenge to the validity of what the directors have done. But where a company is insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude. They become prospectively entitled, through the mechanism of liquidation, to displace the power of the shareholders and directors to deal with the company's assets. It is in a practical sense their assets and not the shareholders' assets that, through the medium of the company, are under the management of the directors pending either liquidation, return to solvency, or the imposition of some alternative administration. There is, however, an important yet ill-defined exception to the legal primacy of shareholder interests. Several courts have held that once the corporation becomes insolvent, directors owe a fiduciary duty to creditors. This shift of fiduciary obligation takes place even if insolvency occurs long before liquidation or commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. Arguably, this duty to creditors can be construed broadly to require directors to take actions that would maximize the creditors' interests once the firm becomes insolvent. On the other hand, this duty can be construed more narrowly to require only that the directors treat all creditors equally and to prohibit directors form withdrawing corporate assets for the benefit of themselves, shareholders, or some preferred creditors. 
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The duty described reads very much like part of the directors' duty to the company, and enforceable by the shareholders of the company (or where breached, ratifiable by the shareholders). What could be more sensible on the part of the directors in the execution of their responsibilities to the company, than to ensure that creditors, especially creditors on whom the company may well depend, are well treated. A failure to do so may be explained away by a short term liquidity and would be likely to attract understanding and ratification on the part of the shareholders. But a failure to do so that could not be readily explained and which caused loss to the company would certainly be open to redress by the shareholders. It may well be that Mr Justice Mason had no revolutionary intentions. Now, however, that the genie is out of the bottle, should we regard this dutyshifting principle a desirable addition to the legal tools for the governance of insolvent companies? Its economic justification is to reset the balance between creditors and entrepreneurs, which, arguably is both presumptuous and cavalier. If something so fundamental is in need of adjustment, it can hardly be appropriate for this to come about in the form of a principle which is deeply uncertain both as to scope and incidence. 'Ill-defined' 80 seems to be the closest we can get to describing it and the notion of a 'zone of insolvency' is quaint at
best. An appropriate simile may be that of a blind man in a dark room looking for a black cat that isn't there. It is argued that in the United States the dutyshifting principle has a long tradition, deriving, from the old trust fund doctrine, 81 whose origin is ascribed to a judgment of Justice Joseph Story in 1824, 82 Yet, should not some thought be given to its widespread appearance? This is intriguing and may be a general response to some trend arising from recent global or near-global financial phenomena. But apart from a similar description in the several jurisdictions, it does not seem possible to construct out of these but the link must be tenuous at best. It is, to my mind, a telling fact that all the sources which declare the existence of the shift in the duty are concerned with events in the formal insolvency. Could -it is not possible to say whether the duty whose focus shifts from shareholders to creditors, is precisely the same duty or set of duties as that or those owed by the directors to the company and shareholders during the period when the company is a solvent, going concern. The director's fiduciary duty would seem a very uneasy transplant, given its emphasis on accountability for profits from unauthorised use of the company's property and its concern for the misappropriation of the company's property. If damages are awarded against a director for the misappropriation of the company's property, or the director is ordered to account for taking unauthorised profits or using a corporate opportunity for his or her own benefit, would the proceeds of such an award be impressed with a trust in favour of the creditors?
The director's duty of care seems a little more ripe for transplant, but if, indeed, the directors acted without due care and attention causing a diminution in the value of the company's property, would a single creditor really have a right of action against the directors during the period before any formal filing for insolvency? And, if so, would the claim be for the loss in value of the company's property or for the debt owed by the company to the creditor? This may seem a somewhat satirical approach to this issue, but it does seem to me to highlight an important and as yet unexplored feature of this duty-shifting principle. One answer to the satirical questions may be that such circumstances are never contemplated and that these are duties whose breach only has consequences when the company is already in a formal insolvency and whose effect is only designed to swell the insolvent estate for the benefit of the whole class of creditors. But if this is so, in what sense is it appropriate to speak of the duty shifting before the formal insolvency is declared?
83 Supra n 74.
/211 60 we say with confidence that a creditor would have standing where, before any formal insolvency, he or she sought to prevent the directors from acting on a decision which the creditor believed would lessen the chances of his or her debt being paid? 84
Conclusion
No one would dispute the principle that in a formal corporate insolvency, the estate should be charged with the payment, as far as possible, of the company's debts. One might also feel comfortable, if not entirely happy, with the principle that the estate should benefit from contributions by the directors and officers whose conduct contributed to the insolvent liquidation of the company. Equally, most people would accept the necessity that entrepreneurs should benefit from a principle which protects their own private estate should the company, through with the entrepreneurial activity being conducted, go into insolvent liquidation. Society, in general, it is thought, wants to encourage entrepreneurial activity and the limitation of the entrepreneur's liability is accepted as the necessary incentive for this. There is, clearly a delicate balance to be struck between creditors and entrepreneurs. If this is now thought to be in need of adjustment, in its current uncertain state, the shifting of the focus of the directors' duties does not seem appropriate for this purpose. 
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